



Mitigating the Spread of Antimicrobial Resistance in Healthcare Settings through Real-time Genomic Surveillance of Bacterial Plasmids


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Early Signs of an Outbreak

Investigation prompted in April 2022:

- 3 patients (*March-April 2022*) at UPMC Presbyterian Hospital
- Clinical cultures yielded 4 total bacterial isolates.
 - Blood, Bone, Urine
- All 4 isolates were flagged as carbapenem resistant Enterobacterales (CREs).




Early Signs of an Outbreak

Species classification:

- 4 isolates belonged to distinct genera:

- *Raoultella*
- *Proteus*
- *Morganella*
- *Klebsiella*




Early Signs of an Outbreak

AMR classification:

- PCR confirmed carbapenemase in all 4 organisms as **New Delhi metallo- β -lactamase (NDM)**.

New Delhi metallo- β -lactamase (NDM):

- Emerging mechanism of carbapenem resistance seen in healthcare-associated infections (HAIs).
- First isolated in 2008, NDM is associated with an increased risk of mortality and limited therapeutic options.^[1]
- Encoded by the *bla*_{NDM} gene.




Early Signs of an Outbreak

Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS):

- Dozens of different **NDM variants** have been identified in more than 60 host species, spanning multiple bacterial families.^[2]
- Illumina short-read WGS data identified **2 NDM variants** present amongst the 4 isolates.

• *bla*_{NDM-1}

• *bla*_{NDM-5}




Early Signs of an Outbreak

Suspicious of mobile AMR:

1. NDM had rarely been observed previously at our center.
2. NDM-5 variant appeared in 3 bacterial isolates of different Enterobacterales species.
3. Patient 2 was co-colonized with two species, each harboring the **NDM-5** variant.

Conclusion: the **NDM-5** gene may be carried on a mobile genetic element, such as a bacterial plasmid.




The Bacterial Genome

Bacterial Chromosome (2-8Mbp)

- Single, circular strand of double stranded DNA.
- Chromosome can harbor AMR genes.


Plasmids (5-500kbp)

- Small, circular pieces of DNA outside the bacterial chromosome.
- Bacterial HAI's often carry plasmids encoding AMR, leading to infections with complicated therapy and poor patient outcomes. [3]
- Bacterial plasmids can be acquired, carried, and shared through a mechanism called horizontal plasmid transfer.



Horizontal Plasmid Transfer

- Can occur within a **co-colonized patient** or a **hospital environment contaminated with two or more bacterial species**.
- These types of settings provide the opportunity for a **plasmid to transfer between species**.
- May result in **transmission of the newly resistant bacterial species** harboring the resistance-encoding plasmid to other hospitalized patients.



Horizontal plasmid transfer between bacteria species A and B.


Thomas CM, Nielsen KM. Mechanisms of, and barriers to, horizontal gene transfer between bacteria. Nat Rev Microbiol. 2005;3(9):711-721. doi:10.1038/nrmicro1234

Plasmid Investigation

Suspicion of plasmid-mediated AMR:

- We conducted long-read WGS on isolates to achieve greater resolution.
- In conjunction with Illumina data, Nanopore long-read WGS data for the same isolates was used to create **hybrid assembled genomes**.
- **Hybrid assemblies** offer several advantages:
 - Maintain the accuracy of SR assemblies
 - More easily resolve repeat regions, resulting in assemblies with fewer, larger contigs.

<https://github.com/rrwick/Unicycler>




Hybrid Assembly: tangled short-read genome assembly resolved through direct long-read bridging. (Unicycler)

Plasmid Investigation

- More easily associate AMR genes with the chromosome or extrachromosomal elements.

Illumina Assembly For Isolate X




Hybrid Assembly For Isolate X



Plasmid
Reconstruction
→
from Assembly

Illumina Assembly For Isolate X



Hybrid Assembly For Isolate X




ARG and plasmid
typing genes present
on different Illumina
contigs.


Plasmid Investigation

Plasmid Characterization:

- Hybrid assemblies of the isolates from Patients 2 and 3 showed NDM-5 was carried on a near-identical IncX3 family plasmid.
- The plasmid carried additional mobility genes classifying it as conjugative.
- Taken together, this was convincing evidence of a plasmid-associated outbreak of AMR.




The IncX3 NDM-5 Outbreak Plasmid



Plasmid Investigation

- WGS as used in outbreak investigations detects same-species transmission, and is largely **not designed to identify multispecies, plasmid-associated outbreaks**, because they involve both:^[6]


- 1) Horizontal plasmid transfer** of a common resistance gene-encoding plasmid among *different* bacterial species.
- 2) Bacterial transmission** of plasmid-harboring clonal strains.



Plasmid-associated outbreak of drug-resistant bacteria involving plasmid transfer and bacterial transmission.

Thus, in most cases specialized WGS and bioinformatic approaches must be incorporated to resolve plasmid sequences from isolates.

Building a Response



1. Begin a Traditional Outbreak Investigation

- Obtain swabs from eligible individuals to detect plasmid carriage through:
 - Conducting repeated active surveillance around identified index patients.
 - Continuing routine carbapenem-resistant organism surveillance to identify additional carriers.

Building a Response



2. Leverage the Enhanced Detection System for Healthcare-Associated Transmission (EDS-HAT) to collect and connect isolates using WGS

- **Collection:** High-priority pathogens are collected from patients with prior UPMC admissions or encounters for **WGS surveillance** as part of EDS-HAT.
- **Connection:** EDS-HAT performs real-time bacterial WGS (Illumina) at UPMC Presbyterian Hospital to **detect healthcare-associated bacterial transmission events** using genetic relatedness of isolates (<15 SNPs).

3. Supplement EDS-HAT's short-read Illumina sequencing with Nanopore long-read sequencing of CRE's and create hybrid assemblies to resolve plasmids.

Building a Response



4. Conduct a review of the Electronic Health Record to identify the plausible epidemiological routes of plasmid transfer and bacterial transmission events.

Plasmid Transfer

- **Intra-patient Plasmid Transfer**
(same plasmid, same patient, different species)
- **Putative Inter-Patient Plasmid Transfer**
(same plasmid, different patient, different species, + requires strong epi-route identified between patients)


Bacterial Transmission

- **Low SNP difference, with or without epi-route identified**

The IncX3 NDM-5 Plasmid Outbreak:

Bacterial Transmission and Plasmid Transfer Events

Isolate Species



IncX3 Plasmid
Harboring *bla*_{NDM-5}



Plasmid Horizontal Transfer Events

Intra-Patient
Plasmid Transfer



Inter-Patient
Plasmid Transfer



Bacterial Transmission Events


Low SNP Difference
and Epi Link




Low SNP Difference
and No Epi Link



Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs)



The NDM-5 Outbreak by Hospital Unit



Raabe et al. Real-time genomic epidemiologic investigation of a multispecies plasmid-associated hospital outbreak of NDM-5-producing Enterobacterales infections, IJID (2024)

Building a Response

5. Develop and employ infection prevention interventions which target the identified epidemiological routes of plasmid transfer and transmission.

- **16 total plasmid transfer or bacterial transmission events across various hospital units.**
 - 6 bacterial transmissions
 - 6 inter-patient plasmid transfers
 - 4 intra-patient plasmid transfers
- **We instituted preventions targeting these event routes.**
 - Education and terminal cleans
 - Outbreak appeared to stop in early 2023, where 4 months passed without detecting the outbreak plasmid.

Table 2. Details of transmission events

Event	Event Date	Event Type	Putative Source / Recipient Patient ID	Patient ID Bacterial Species	Core Bacterial Genome SNPs	Hypothesized Bacterial Transmission / Plasmid Transfer Route	Route-specific IP&C Intervention
A	Mar. – Apr. 2022	Inter-patient plasmid transfer	3 → 2	3) <i>K. aerogenes</i> 2) <i>M. morgani</i> or <i>P. mirabilis</i>	NA	Shared unit, shared ancillary staff (within 1 hour)	Education to unit reinforcing basic infection prevention practices.
B	Apr. – Jun. 2022	Intra-patient plasmid transfer	2 ↔ 2	2) <i>P. mirabilis</i> 2) <i>M. morgani</i>	NA	Co-colonization	NA
J	Aug. 2022	Bacterial Transmission	6 → 7	6) <i>E. hormaechei</i> 7) <i>E. hormaechei</i>	3	Shared hospital unit (same time)	Supervised terminal clean of patient room by environmental services leader. Education to unit reinforcing basic infection prevention practices.

Key Points

- Identified a multispecies, IncX3 *bla*_{NDM-5} plasmid outbreak by combining WGS with epidemiological data to track bacterial transmission and plasmid transfer in real time.
- Sequencing data informed interventions targeting routes of plasmid transfer and bacterial transmission to mitigate the AMR outbreak.

Real-time plasmid surveillance could detect hidden multi-species outbreaks that current genomic surveillance methods miss, enabling earlier intervention to halt the spread of antimicrobial resistance.

Acknowledgements

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

ENHANCED DETECTION SYSTEM FOR
HEALTHCARE-ASSOCIATED TRANSMISSION OF
INFECTION

R21AI178369

TRACKING PLASMID SPREAD AND TRANSMISSION IN
THE HOSPITAL: A NOVEL TOOL FOR INFECTION
PREVENTION AND CONTROL

References:

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- [4] Thomas CM, Nielsen KM. Mechanisms of, and barriers to, horizontal gene transfer between bacteria. *Nat Rev Microbiol*. 2005;3(9):711-721. doi:10.1038/nrmicro1234
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- [6] Raabe NJ, Valek AL, Griffith MP, Mills E, Waggle K, Srinivasa VR, Ayres AM, Bradford C, Creager HM, Pless LL, Sundermann AJ, Van Tyne D, Snyder GM, Harrison LH. Real-time genomic epidemiologic investigation of a multispecies plasmid-associated hospital outbreak of NDM-5-producing Enterobacterales infections. *Int J Infect Dis*. 2024 May;142:106971. doi: 10.1016/j.ijid.2024.02.014. Epub 2024 Feb 17. PMID: 38373647; PMCID: PMC11055495.




Supplemental Material


Continued plasmid surveillance

Identifying other plasmid-associated outbreaks of NDM at our center:

- Continued collection of CREs and retrospective analyses led to the identification of instances of NDM variants which were not part of the IncX3 NDM-5 plasmid outbreak.
- Only bla_{NDM-1} and bla_{NDM-5} were identified in our 40 isolate collection from November 2020 to March 2024.




Incidence of NDM Variants




Distribution of 40 NDM plasmids (NDM-1 & NDM-5) over time, observed in 34 patients from Nov. 2020 to March 2024. The most frequent species was *E. hormaechei* (n=15) and bla_{NDM-5} was the dominant variant (n=24).

Plasmid Clusters




Genetic relatedness of the plasmids based on BLASTn similarity scores. Two major clusters identified: 21 highly conserved *IncX3*(*bla*_{NDM-5}) plasmids in 8 species and 8 more variable *IncC*(*bla*_{NDM-1}) plasmids in 4 species.

Plasmid Clusters over Time



Presence of each NDM plasmid type over extended time periods. Grid shows presence (filled) and absence (empty) of replicons and NDM-type.

Epidemiological Investigation



Epidemiological investigation using ML identified potential transmission routes; including 24 shared units, 8 rooms, 20 procedures, and 24 providers with significant odds ratios (ORs: 8.64–390.93, $p < 1e-4$ –0.0308)